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Introduction
Much ink has been spilled over the years on the portrayal of Africa
and Africans in the second album on the adventures of Tintin, Tintin
au Congo. Written by Hergé in the early 1930s, the book was revised
many times in an effort to respond to critiques that is was an apology of
colonialism.2 Tintin au Congo tells the story of the encounter between
a young, white European and Africa, as imagined by a Belgian artist
living in Brussels in the inter-war period; as such, we can understand
Tintin as a depiction by its author of a particular vision of Africa and
of a certain understanding of Western presence on the continent.
There is also en encounter in the work of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL), this time between international criminal law and the
grim realities of the Sierra Leonean civil war. The judgments of the
SCSL constitute, in their own right, a depiction. The depiction this
time portrays the realities of conflict in Sierra Leone and the court’s
understanding of its own role in that conflict. In these two narratives,
despite their very different origins, modernity and primitivism intersect
and interact; in both cases, the narrator uses magic to decode African
society and make it comprehensible to the imagined reader. In so
doing, the narrator constructs the image of his own identity: in one
case Belgian, European and civilized, and in the other, universal and
rational embodied in international criminal law.

1 Mysticism and Modernity in Tintin au Congo
Its portrayal of Africa as completely permeated by colonialism explains
why Tintin au Congo has sometimes been condemned as racist. African
people are variously depicted as unable to speak correctly (‘me so tired’),
convinced of the physical and intellectual superiority of Westerners
(‘Them say, in Europe all young white men is like Tintin’), unable to
understand foreign objects (the Babaoro’m king who uses a rolling pin
as a sceptre), and wanting nothing more than to conserve their subaltern
colonial status (teaching school children: ‘today, children, I will tell you
about your country: Belgium!’). The purpose of this essay is not to revisit
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these problematic depictions which, for the presumed amusement of the
reader, seek to highlight the enormous cultural gap between Tintin and
the Congolese. Moving beyond this discourse, Hergé also evokes, at
various occasions, magic as a symbol of the backward nature of African
society. We can identify three variants of this encounter between magic
and modernity in three separate episodes of Tintin au Congo: magic is
used as a lie used by local elites to control indigenous people, magic is
used as a tool to further colonial domination, and magic is used as a
barrier beyond which lays unattainable modernity. As we will see, the
interaction between mysticism and modernity in Tintin is not without
striking parallels to that in the jurisprudence of the SCSL.
The first evocation presents magic as a false belief and as a tool in the
hands of elites that allows them to manipulate a gullible population. We
see this with Tintin’s arrival in the Babaoro’m tribe: Tintin is welcomed
by the king, who disappears for the rest of the story and is replaced
as an authority figure in the tribe by the witchdoctor, Muganga. This
linking of power with mysticism is also present in twentieth century
anthropological literature on African societies. As seen in classic texts
by authors such as Max Gluckman (1955) and Edward Evans-Pritchard
(1937), occult power intersects with and is necessary for political power;
witchcraft constitutes an important, if not the most important, vector
of social ordering.

In Hergé’s story, the witchdoctor is displeased by Tintin’s arrival in
his tribe. Tintin managed, bare-handed, to tame a lion which had scared
away all the warriors. This threatens the sorcerer’s control of the tribe
because Tintin’s powers are not connected to the occult. Muganga, who
has allied himself with Tom, an evil white man who wants to get rid of
Tintin, decides to use his ‘magic’ to unjustly accuse Tintin of having
defiled the tribe’s fetish, leading to the latter’s capture. This accusation
effectively writes Tintin’s death sentence. Hergé thus presents magic as
trickery, diverted from its usual function in the tribe in order to serve
the personal interests of the sorcerer and the evil white man, and used
to manipulate the natives. Tintin nevertheless succeeds in escaping his
captors and overhears a conversation between the witchdoctor and the
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evil white man in which they boast of having planned everything: ‘And
I, witch-doctor of Babaoro’m, can keep they ignorant and stupid people
in my power’ (Hergé 2010: 25). Fortunately, Tintin had brought a video
camera and a phonograph with him, allowing him to film everything
and later show it to the Babaoro’m warriors. The warriors feel foolish
for having been tricked by Muganga. The recording also makes it clear
that the witchdoctor himself does not believe in the magic he claims
to control: ‘Ha! Ha! Ha! … If they only knew… How I make fun of
they and their stupid fetish!’ (Hergé 2010: 26).
Modernity, as represented by the western scientific tools that permit
objective access to the truth (the camera, the phonograph), defeats
the supposed magic, an obscurantism hijacked by elites to enslave
the ignorant population. Traditional authority, represented by the
witchdoctor, consequently finds itself replaced by a new, white, and
modern authority in the person of Tintin, whom the warriors proclaim
the new Chief of the Babaoro’m. This modernity is translated as a
source of wisdom (Tintin makes a Solomonic judgment to put end to
a dispute by splitting a hat in half) and of quasi-miraculous scientific
powers (Tintin used quinine to instantly heal and chase what the sick
man’s wife calls ‘bad juju come to live inside him’) (Hergé 2010: 28). We
could also read this last vignette as a metaphor in which mystical beliefs
are an illness for which science and knowledge are the remedy (Ndong
2005). In short, European reason defeats African obscurantism, to the
betterment of all involved.

A second episode in Tintin au Congo invokes magic, but it does
so in a very different way with Tintin as the one who take advantage
of the Africans’ risible beliefs in supernatural powers. In this case,
modernity exploits mysticism to serve its own ends, identifying it as a
source of power that can entrench Western authority in the tribe and
supplant the power traditionally held by witchdoctors. Following their
expulsion, the witchdoctor and Tom the evil white man use deception to
trigger a war between the Babaoro’m and a neighbouring tribe, the ’M
Hatuvu. The king of the ’M Hatuvu is confident that he will be able to
easily defeat his enemy thanks to his army which has been ‘trained and
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equipped like a European army’ (Hergé 2010: 29). European influence
is visibly rendered by the warriors’ bearskin hats and blunderbuss on
wheels which they refer to as ‘heavy artillery’. Tintin positions himself
in the open so as to provoke the enemy. Although they shoot multiple
arrows, the ‘army’ never manages to hit him because the arrows are all
redirected toward a tree behind which Tintin has hidden a powerful
electromagnet. Thus, it is the magic of modernity which provides the
warrior Tintin with an invincibility against the weapons of the enemy.
The warriors mistake modernity for magic because it is exercised in a
manner that is invisible and incomprehensible to them.
Witchcraft is a recurring theme in the context of armed conflict
in Africa and, as we will see, a theme that is also present in the
jurisprudence of the SCSL. More generally, we find in colonialism
the practice of appropriating mystical and far-fetched beliefs for the
purpose of serving western interests. For example, ‘white’ tribunals
made indigenous witnesses swear on potions that indigenous peoples
believed had supernatural powers. In Sierra Leone at the beginning
of the twentieth century, a British court prepared a mixture of salt,
pepper, ashes and water every Monday; witnesses drank this potion
while promising to tell the truth or risk sudden death by snake bite,
drowning, or similar misfortune (Beatty 1915: 25-26).

In Hergé’s story, faced with the impossibility of hitting Tintin with
bow and arrow, the ’M Hatuvu attempt to shoot him with the help
of their ‘heavy artillery’, the blunderbuss. Despite using a technique
modeled in the European instructions (one positions the instrument
at precisely a range of 43.5 metres), the blunderbuss explodes on the
shooters instead of reaching Tintin. This failure completes the metaphor
of modernity as not only incomprehensible to the indigenous people,
but also beyond their reach. It also demonstrates that any attempt to
appropriate modernity and use it against the colonial power is doomed
to fail and ultimately harm the indigenous population. Once defeated
by the magical powers of civilization, the ’M Hatuvu fall prostrate
before Tintin, calling him a ‘great juju man’, and proclaiming him king
of their tribe. They leave the scene singing, happy in their subjugation.
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The third and final use of witchcraft in Tintin au Congo demonstrates
the unattainable nature of modernity; the magical powers of the
Africans are shown as no match for modernity, and in fact ultimately
reinforce their inferiority. In the story, following the thwarting of
their attempt to provoke a war between the two tribes, Muganga
the witchdoctor and his white collaborator learn that Tintin plans
to spend a night on the outskirts of the village, on the lookout for a
leopard. The witchdoctor then reveals that he is a member of a secret
society, the Aniotas. Assassins who dress as leopards in order to kill
their victim, the Aniotas disguise themselves by attaching iron claws
to their hands, covering their body in leopard skin and using a stick
whose carved end leaves the paw-prints of the animal. As the story
unfolds, the phenomenon of the leopard-men is reduced to another
attempt by indigenous elites to exploit the naïve beliefs of the general
population to ‘fight the white man’s civilising influence’ and also to
solidify their hold on power (Hergé 1973: 236). Unsurprisingly, Tintin
easily thwarts the plot hatched against him to unmask – figuratively
and literally – the witchdoctor, and, in the process, actually saves the
life of the witchdoctor who declares himself Tintin’s slave.

The story of the leopard-man has a basis in fact: leopard-men
and, to a lesser extent, crocodile-men and monkey-men, terrorised a
region of Africa at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth centuries. Often associated with the fear of cannibalism,
this practice for decades camouflaged murders thought to be the work
of wild animals. Colonial officials in the Belgian Congo, Sierra Leone
and other colonies reacted to the rise of these assassins at the beginning
of the previous century by a campaign to eradicate the leopard-men,
whose activities destabilized the territory and thereby threatened
colonial authority (Kalous 1974, Beatty 1915, Joset 1995).
It is important to highlight the extent to which, during the last
century and a half, the fear of leopard-men occupied a central place
in African mysticism. Beyond the brotherhood of assassins wearing
leopard skin, as evoked by Hergé, we also see a widespread belief that
some witchdoctors were able to project their spirit into the body of a real

188

'Tintin au Congo'

leopard in order to control it and use it to kill people. The victims were
not only leaders who had been won over by the cause of colonialism,
but also anyone whom the sorcerers wanted to get rid of or whose
death would undermine or increase the authority of a local chief. The
ritual of murder by the leopard-man would bring power and riches to
its sponsor. Anthropological studies have linked these beliefs to the
disappearance of the Atlantic slave trade, which indigenous people
widely associated with a Western cannibalism in which the captives
were taken overseas to be eaten (Shaw 1996: 48).
Many have suggested that murder by the leopard-men constituted
another form of consumption, because the word ‘to eat’ in many
dialects evokes more generally the ritualistic appropriation of the power
contained in the body of another person (Shaw 2001: 59). Mystical
beliefs were used as evidence of the primitive nature of African society
at the time, serving to justify colonial expansion. Colonialism was thus
aimed at civilizing the population and also at liberating Africa from the
yoke of false beliefs. In Tintin au Congo, colonialism is needed as the
new truth, symbolized by the last image in the book where a warrior
comes to kneel before fetishes in the image of Tintin and Milou, who
have replaced the magic fetish that the tribe had venerated before.

The encounter between mysticism and modernity in Tintin au
Congo marks a well-defined line between these two universes. This line
affirms ontological distinctions between fact and non-fact, truth and
fantasy, civilization and barbarism. One could say that the famous ‘clear
line’ developed by Hergé to structure his illustrations is meaningful
not only formally but also conceptually. The line dividing witchcraft
and modernity is equally clear; the two cannot co-exist. One effect
of modernity’s rational discourse is to make any consultation of the
occult illegitimate; relying on the occult is like relying on a lie and
evidences gullibility, if not madness. We would expect therefore that
the juridical discourse at the heart of international criminal law would
subscribe to this dominance of rational thinking. Instead, as we see
in the judgments of the SCSL in the case of Fofana et Kondewa, it is
not always as easy as Hergé makes it seem in Tintin au Congo to draw
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a fine line between mysticism and modernity.

2 The Limits of Rational Discourse in Fofana and
Kondewa
Allieu Kondewa was one of the defendants in the trial of the leaders of
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) before the SCSL. He was accused of
eight counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law (Prosecutor v Moinina
Fofana and Allieu Kondewa Trial Chamber - hereafter CDF Trial).
The charges against Kondewa are unique because he never personally
committed any of the crimes of which he is accused. Attributing
international criminal responsibility on the basis of the responsibility
of superiors or commanders, or through application of the doctrine of
aiding and abetting, is not uncommon; in this case, however, Kondewa
did not hold a political or military role of the type that normally
attracts responsibility for the act of another. Kondewa was instead the
witchdoctor for the CDF, officiating initiation ceremonies for new
fighters in the secret society of Kamajors and administering lotions and
potions to make fighters invisible and invincible to bullets. The SCSL
was therefore called to pronounce upon the legal implications of occult
magical rituals in international criminal law. This exercise provoked a
lively debate amongst the judges regarding the place of magic in the
law. This debate reflects the ambiguous character of the interaction
of legal discourse, an emblem of modernity, and certain mystical
beliefs that remain present in Africa. We see here one of the themes
that inspired Hergé in Tintin au Congo, the encounter between the
universalizing West and black Africa. Contrary to Tintin, which was
a monologue by Hergé, the judgments of the SCSL in the CDF Trial
are a dialogue between authors with contrasting perspectives. Thus,
the jurisprudence of the SCSL offers a real site of encounter, where
differing visions of the nature of law and its conjugation in different
cultures are articulated. After briefly presenting the foundations of the
jurisdiction of the SCSL, we will highlight how the Trial Chamber
and the majority of the Appeals Chamber reduce facts through law.
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We will then contrast this with the sensational dissent by the Sierra
Leonean president of the Appeals Chamber, for whom the law must
separate itself entirely from a discourse based on false beliefs.
2A General Context
The civil war that raged in Sierra Leone during the 1990s implicated,
on both sides of the conflict, diverse armed groups which committed
large-scale abuses of all kinds. The rebel groups Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) are
generally blamed for the worst abuses, including countless civilian
executions, sexual violence and slavery, amputations, kidnappings,
forced marriages, theft, and destruction of property. That said,
groups allied with the government of Sierra Leone, like the Civil
Defence Forces (CDF), also committed grave violations such as the
recruitment and use of child-soldiers and torture. Even the force sent
by the regional economic organisation, ECOWAS, has faced serious
accusations of having committed extrajudicial executions of suspects
(Horvitz & Catherwood 2006: 136-137). In the media and in reports
of international observers the conflict was generally portrayed as
marked by extreme, unrestrained, even irrational violence in the hands
of children and irregular fighters all of whom were acting under the
influence of diverse drugs. More specifically, this media representation
revealed a Western fascination for the profoundly bizarre superposition
of modern warfare with ancestral practices and beliefs: the image of a
cannibal warrior covered in talismans, fighting with an AK-47, evokes
an ahistorical primitivism that is incompatible with modernity (Shaw
2002: 82, Anders 2011: 940).
After many failed attempts to end the conflict, the Government
and the insurgents signed a peace agreement in Lomé in 1999, the
terms of which required the insurgents to turn over their weapons in
exchange for a role in the Government and an amnesty for all crimes
committed during the civil war. The agreement called for the creation of
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which required the presence
of a large contingent of international peacekeepers. It became rapidly
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clear to representatives of the international community that the amnesty
declared by the Lomé Agreement was an obstacle preventing them
from addressing the root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, thereby
threatening the peace that had been so difficult to achieve. Following
negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United
Nations, as well as resolution 1315 of the Security Council, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone was created in order to try the leaders who were
most responsible for the crimes committed during the civil war in the
country after November 30, 1996 (Resolution 1315 2000). According to
the governing statute of the SCSL, these crimes could be violations of
international norms prohibiting crimes against humanity, war crimes
or other violations of international humanitarian law, or other acts
criminal under Sierra-Leonean laws on abuse against girls and wanton
destruction of property (Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
2002). In practice, the SCSL functions essentially as an international
criminal tribunal, and its analysis is almost exclusively situated in
jurisprudence and texts relevant to international law (Jalloh 2010).
Although the SCSL is a hybrid institution with a mixed jurisdiction,
it produces international law lacking much reference to the local legal
context. The CDF Trial and the issue of Allieu Kondewa’s responsibility
as a superior highlight the necessary vernaculisation of international
justice in the jurisprudence of the SCSL and challenge the normative
possibility of isolating international criminal law from the context in
which it is applied (Merry 2009).

The Civil Defence Forces are a paramilitary group created in 1997
to protect the elected Government of Sierra Leone against other
groups who had usurped power in the country (Hoffman 2007).
Kamajors, members of a traditional hunting society that ensured the
security of villages against all threats, both physical and metaphysical,
constituted the nucleus of the CDF. Historically, the main task of the
Kamajors (‘hunters’ in the Mende language) was to gather meat for
the village. After the coup d’état and the outbreak of a new civil war
in Sierra Leone, the Government decided to co-opt the Kamajors in
order to make them the spearhead of the effort to regain power. The
fallen president of Sierra Leone named the man who would become
192
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the guiding spirit of the CDF, Samuel Hinga Norman, as its ‘national
coordinator’. Hinga was also one of the three original co-accused in
the trial of the CDF. Hinga directed the CDF along with Moinina
Fofana, ‘Director of War,’ and Allieu Kondewa, ‘High Priest’. An
expert at the Trial Chamber of the SCSL described these three men
as the Holy Trinity of the CDF: Norman, Father God; Fofana, the
Son; Kondewa, the Holy Ghost (CDF Trial: par 337).

Each member of the triumvirate exercised functions distinct from
those of the others, but no important decision was reached without the
agreement of all three. As to Kondewa, his role as High Priest meant
that he presided over all initiation ceremonies for new members to the
Kamajors society, using potions and ceremonies he had created. He
prepared a mix of magical herbs that fighters would rub on themselves in
order to become invincible to bullets. For each new battle, the Kamajors
would line up before Kondewa to receive his benediction, and Kondewa
would read their fortunes and decide who was fated to fight on that
particular day. No Kamajor would dare participate in a battle without
the blessing of their High Priest (CDF Trial: par 344-347). Kondewa
never personally went to the battle sites and, most importantly, never
gave orders of an operational or strategic nature. With one exception, he
was not charged with having directly committed a single international
crime.3 As mentioned above, Kondewa is indicted with crimes based
on his criminal responsibility for the act others.
In terms of the legal issues in the case, the Appeals Chamber and
the Trial Chamber of the SCSL adopted a very standard approach to the
issue of imputing responsibility to Kondewa for the actions of others.
In fact, the prosecutor and the defence agreed on the major tenets of
the doctrine of superior responsibility and on the doctrine of aiding
and abetting, the two modes of participation by which the Prosecutor
sought to link Kondewa to the actual facts and actions that were direct
violations of international criminal law. Importantly, as we have already
seen, Kondewa was not charged with having personally committed
any reprehensible act. With respect to his responsibility as a superior,
the facts implicate Kondewa through short speeches and benedictions
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given during parades prior to the start of missions during which others
committed acts that violate international law. Kondewa’s responsibility
is also based on the fact that he presided over initiation ceremonies for
child soldiers and rituals that were meant to make fighters invincible
(bullet-proofing). With respect to aiding and abetting, Kondewa’s
role as one of the three directors of the CDF, who had to approve all
operations undertaken by the group, was invoked. Application of the
doctrine of aiding and abetting in the judgments again turns on the
legal effect of some allocutions delivered by Kondewa as well as his
position in the CDF structure.

The articulation of the doctrine of superior responsibility is now
well recognized in international criminal law, primarily due to the
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. As agreed by all sides in the CDF Trial, a
defendant can be held responsible for the act of another if he exercised,
at the time of the event, ‘effective control’ over this other person or
group. In order for this to be the case, the existence of a relationship of
authority between the accused and the direct author of the crime must
be proven in a manner that would permit the former to issue orders
to the latter, to prevent the committing of international crimes, or to
punish the commission of the crimes (Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and
Allieu Kondewa Appeal Chamber - hereinafter CDF Appeal: par 161). This
relationship could be one of authority de jure, based on the position of
the accused in the hierarchy of a group, taking into consideration the
nature of the group and its rules and structure. It could also be one
of de facto authority, perhaps through some dominion exercised by an
individual over others in particular circumstances, even if this dynamic
is not recognized on an institutional level.
A relationship of authority calling for criminal responsibility can
exist as much in a military framework as in a civilian context. In the
case at hand, with respect to applying this doctrine to Kondewa,
all judges agreed that any differences between the positions of the
prosecution and that of the defence were factual and not substantive
(CDF Appeal: par 171). Despite this, it was precisely a factual issue that
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revealed a fracture between the four judges constituting the majority
of the Appeals Chamber and the dissenter, Judge John Gelaga King.
This divide reflects diverging visions of the nature of international
criminal law and, more generally, of the identity of the legal discourse
of a tribunal like the SCSL.
2B The Trial Chamber and the majority of the Appeals
Chamber
For the majority of judges in the CDF Trial, both at the trial and appeal
levels, Kondewa’s legal responsibility as a superior comes from the fact
that the fighters believed that Kondewa had effective control over them.
Thus, the factual analysis turns on whether this belief actually existed,
not on whether the powers claimed by Kondewa are real. We can divide
this question posed by the majority into two parts. First, did this belief
exist in the minds of the fighters who committed international crimes?
Second, was this belief of a nature to confer on Kondewa the level of
control required in order for him to be charged with these crimes, in
the name of superior responsibility?
In the Trial Chamber of the SCSL, the judges described how the
fighters perceived Kondewa in the following terms:
The Kamajors believed in mystical powers of the initiators, especially
Kondewa, and that the process of the initiation and immunisation
would make them “bullet-proof ”. The Kamajors looked up to Kondewa
and admired the man with such powers. They believed that he was
capable of transferring his powers to them to protect them. By virtue
of these powers Kondewa had command over the Kamajors in the
country. He never went to the war front himself, but whenever a
Kamajor was going to war, Kondewa would give his advice and
blessings, as well as the medicine which the Kamajors believed would
protect them against bullets. No Kamajor would go to war without
Kondewa’s blessings (par 721).

In this lengthy trial level judgment, we find multiple references to
Kondewa’s mystical status in the eyes of the fighters. These passages
have the same vague formulation as the above quote (CDF Trial: par
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765).4 For the Court, Kondewa’s role as High Priest gave him a de jure
status within the CDF, an official role that completes the operational
and strategic command roles held by the two other accused. That said,
despite its repeated emphasis on Kondewa’s influence over the fighters,
the Trial Chamber concluded that it was not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that this power was of a nature to prevent or punish violations
of international law. Without this type of effective control, the simple
role of High Priest is insufficient to charge Kondewa with command
responsibility (CDF Trial: par 853).5 Similarly, the mere fact that in
1998 Kondewa reviewed the fighters, blessing them and giving them
potions to make them bullet-proof, was not sufficient for the SCSL to
find him to have aided and abetted in the commission of the crimes
by the fighters (CDF Trial: par 765, 800).

Despite this finding, the judges at trial did not find that the
Kamajors’ belief in Kondewa’s mystical powers was without any effect.
Thus, in another troop review in 1997, Kondewa was found to have
aided and abetted in the crimes of Samuel Norman because he had
encouraged the Kamajors to follow Norman’s exhortation to take
no prisoner. The Trial Chamber explained the impact of Kondewa’s
speeches and blessings by referring to the belief of the Kamajors
in the High Priest’s mystical powers (par 735-739). Similarly, the
court concluded that in one particular district, Kondewa had a
special relationship with the local commander that went beyond
his relationship with the Kamajors in the rest of the country. In the
district of Bonthe, for reasons that are not clear from the facts, the
operational commander of the Kamajors battalion, a Mr. Kamara,
considered himself under Kondewa’s authority. Kondewa’s effective
control allowed him to prevent or punish crimes committed by fighters,
issue written and oral orders, and threaten to punish anyone who lied
to him with ‘a terrible death’ (par 869). The Trial Chamber treated the
exact foundation of this authority with a degree of vagueness:
By virtue of his de jure status as High Priest Kondewa [sic] and his de
facto status as a superior to these Kamajors in that District, Kondewa
exercised effective control over them. Kondewa had the legal and
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material ability to issue orders to Kamara, both by reason of his
leadership role at Base Zero, being part of the CDF High Command,
and the authority he enjoyed in his position as High Priest in Sierra
Leone and particularly so in Bonthe District (par 868).6

It is significant that in this passage Kondewa is described by the
SCSL as a High Priest of Sierra Leone in general and of the Bonthe
district in particular: the narrative moves beyond the distinct belief
in the minds of those who committed the violations to evoke instead
Kondewa’s objective status within the country as a whole. Despite
what might be the reassuring use of the legal categories of de jure and
de facto to classify the nature of Kondewa’s authority, it seems futile
to try to disentangle what, in this particular context, would belong
to one category as opposed to the other. It is clear that Kondewa’s
magical powers are inseparable from the other sources of his authority,
and contribute simultaneously to his de jure and de facto statuses. The
taxonomic inclination of law, which longs to define, identify, interpret
and classify facts and norms, finds itself challenged by the multivalent
nature of mysticism, which is difficult to reconcile with known legal
categories.

It is often noted that that the ontological distinction between fact
and law reflects a peculiarly Western evolution in legal thinking (Glenn
2010: 149). As in the case at hand, separating facts from the law evokes
a violent, often arbitrary, dislocation of reality as it is perceived by the
actors involved. In a context involving the activities of a witchdoctor
within a secret society that is part of an armed conflict in Africa,
the discourse of international criminal law struggles to make that
separation. The Trial Chamber thus approaches the legal classification
of Kondewa’s magical powers with some caution, recognizing that they
could have a real impact on the application of international criminal
law, but the Court does not clearly articulate the precise nature of
those implications.
If the decision of the Trial Chamber is marked by caution bordering
on vagueness, the majority of the Appeals Chamber opted for an evasive
manoeuvre to marginalize mysticism. With respect to the question of
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whether the Trial Chamber committed an error of fact on the issue of
Kondewa’s involvement in 1997 Passing Out parade, the defence and
prosecution agreed that the applicable standard was that of ‘substantial
effect’ (CDF Appeal: par 70-75). The majority on appeal limited itself
to essentially describing the reasoning of the Trial Chamber, without
adding to it. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber adopted the conclusion
of the trial court that the mere fact that Kondewa had given medicine
to the Kamajors in order to make them bulletproof during another
passing out parade in 1998 did not constitute aiding and abetting in the
acts committed at the hands of the fighters (par 89, 110). Conversely,
on the issue of Kondewa’s responsibility as a superior, a difference of
opinion appeared between the Trial and Appeals chambers with respect
to the legal significance of Kondewa’s mystical role in the CDF. Here,
again, the parties agreed that the applicable test in order to determine
the existence of a superior/subordinate relationship is whether there
was ‘effective control’ (CDF Appeal: par 174).7 The defence stressed
the inconsistency, even the incoherence, of the analysis of the Trial
Chamber which, on the one hand, denied that Kondewa’s role as High
Priest and his mystical powers could by themselves give him effective
control over the Kamajors but, on the other hand, found that those
same mystical powers and role contributed to his effective control in
the Bonthe district. The majority of the Appeals Chamber recognized
that this presented a tension, and concluded that Kondewa’s role as
High Priest and his mystical powers were not relevant. Effective
control could be found despite these facts by concentrating solely on
the factual authority of Kondewa over the Kamajor commanders in
the Bonthe district (par 179) (Combs 2010: 212-214). Using the same
logic, the majority at appeal overturned a conviction for looting in the
Moyamba district, because a declaration that the role and mystical
powers of Kondewa are irrelevant did not leave a sufficient base to find
effective control in that region (par 212-215).
In the judgment of the Trial Chamber, magic was treated with
caution and discussed elliptically, making its legal implications
ambiguous. The decision of the majority of the Appeals Chamber marks
an even greater disengagement from the issue of magic, demonstrated
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by its willingness to reject the relevance of Kondewa’s mystical role.8
This makes Judge King’s thunderous dissent in the appeal decision
even more startling.

The judgments of the SCSL in the CDF Case constitute a narrative
where rational, Western, civilized modernity is confronted with
mysticism, a symbol of pre-colonial African primitivism. How can
we understand the dynamic of the interaction between these two
discourses? In the interaction between modernity and mysticism in
the judgements at first instance and on appeal, we find the same three
dynamics that we identified earlier in Tintin au Congo. Seen in this
light, the narrative of the majority in the CDF Appeals Judgment can
be viewed as furthering the myth of savagery evoked by Hergé in his
story of the adventures of Tintin in the Congo.

First, like the manipulation of the Babaoro’m by the witchdoctor
Muganga in Tintin au Congo, we can understand that magic is used
by Kondewa as a tool that permits him to control the Kamajors
by exploiting their gullibility and ignorance. By leveraging the
desperate desire of young fighters to survive a vicious war, the accused
manipulated a system of traditional beliefs to serve their own ends.
There are, not only in the judgments but also in the examination of
witnesses and final arguments, allusions by the lawyers to the fact
that such beliefs seem absurd (CDF Trial Transcripts 2006: 36). By
highlighting the absurdity of believing that smearing oneself in herbs
and lotions could make one bulletproof, the lawyers signalled to the
judges their membership in the rational world of law. This is a world
distinct from mysticism, for which mysticism is in fact an ‘other’ whose
rejection shapes law’s identity.

Unlike Tintin, who demonstrated to the Congolese the falsity
of their beliefs through objects of modernity such as video and
sound recorders, the defence invited the judges to abstain from
pronouncing on the values and beliefs of the Kamajors: ‘The Kamajors
should not be patronized or judged more harshly for using means
that seem less advanced or more … or more unbelievable to others’
(CDF Trial Transcripts 2006: 37). It is this invitation to abstain from
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imposing an external perspective on beliefs that, as we saw, the Trial
Chamber and the majority at appeal for the most part heeded. This
charitable suspension of incredulousness corresponds to the ‘rituals of
distanciation’, an expression used to describe and criticize the attitude
of English historians with respect to witchcraft: by reducing mystical
belief to an abnormality or pathology, it becomes justifiable to explain
nothing but the causes of the belief and ignore its structure and content
(Purkiss 1996: 61 as cited in Geschiere 1998: 1275). With respect to
the legal discourse, this ‘ritual of distanciation’ leads the judges away
from examining the merits or content of supernatural beliefs. Instead,
the judges reduce these beliefs to facts the legal implications of which
must be determined.

In Tintin au Congo, a second interaction between modernity
and mysticism appears in the form of modernity’s appropriation of
mysticism: Tintin uses an electro-magnet to redirect arrows away
from him and also convinces the tribesmen that he possesses magic
powers that make him invincible. In the analysis of the SCSL there
is a also a hijacking of mystical beliefs by the legal discourse to serve
its own ends, in this case the administration of international criminal
responsibility. Even though the Trial Chamber was not interested in
the content of the Kamajors’ belief that Kondewa possessed the power
to project his spirit to make them brave and to prepare medicine to
render them bulletproof, the court still attached consequences to this
belief. The fact as interpreted by the law is thus emptied of its content;
the system of beliefs and traditional practices is reduced to a category
defined entirely by international law. The customary cosmology of
Sierra Leone is kidnapped by the cosmology of international law, which
consumes it, saving only the parts that serve its own purposes. It is
a conjuring which operates thanks to the magic of international law.
Starting with a factual setting, law can create a narrative that depicts a
reality very different from that perceived by its principal participants. As
highlighted by Clifford Geertz, legal representation of fact is normative
from the start (1983: 174). The image of the process by which facts
are construed or even created by the SCSL suggests a disengagement
of international criminal law from the process of vernacularizing
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justice, despite the stated ambition to contribute to the post-conflict
reconstruction of society in Sierra Leone. Far from vernacularizing,
the legal narrative thus created affirms its own modernity by distancing
itself from a mythical other (Fitzpatrick 1992: 21).

The final example of the interaction between modernity and
mysticism suggests that Tintin, as a symbol of Western civilization,
cannot be undermined by the baleful power of the African leopard-man.
There is a similar parallel with the impact that engagement with magic,
of the kind we see in the CDF case, would have on the jurisprudence
of the SCSL, particularly on its credibility. If the tribunal were to
recognise the existence of Kondewa’s magical powers would distort the
logic of international criminal law due to the dyspeptic nature of such
irrational thinking, thinking that is incompatible with legal reasoning.
But, as we have seen, the approach of the SCSL eludes this pitfall by
completely emptying the belief of its content, such that the only content
left is that required for Kondewa to have the necessary control to find
him guilty on the grounds of superior responsibility.

The defence, however, made an effort to use the content of the
belief for its own purposes, arguing that during the magical initiations
and ceremonies over which Kondewa presided, he transferred not only
his spirit to the fighters to give them courage and invincibility, but he
also gave them ‘the law’. The defence relied on witnesses from both
the defence and the prosecution to the effect that Kamajors had an
obligation to respect the elderly, not to steal the property of civilians,
not to kill innocents, and not to harass civilians. In fact, according to
the defence, the Kamajors had an obligation to protect these people
(CDF Trial Transcripts 2006: 33-34). Further, Kondewa said that
any violation of these laws would have the effect of canceling out the
invincibility that had been conferred, leading to the fighter’s death in
battle: ‘What more deterrent against atrocities on civilians can anybody
ask for?’ asked Kandewa’s lawyer (CDF Trial Transcripts 2006: 37).
The defence thus sought to bring the SCSL to the conclusions of its
own logic and to force it to recognize the effects of giving Kondewa’s
magical powers legal meaning in the context of criminal responsibility.
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We could in the same sense imagine a defence resting on the exception
of duress, recognized inter alia in article 31(1)(d) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, if the accused committed a crime under
the threat of a curse pronounced by a witchdoctor. The court would
then be asked to determine if the belief of the accused in danger was
‘real,’ or, in other words, whether the existence of this danger should
be evaluated in an objective manner (‘would a reasonable person have
believed in the threat?’) or in a subjective manner (‘did the accused
honestly feel threatened?’). In African legal systems, it is required in
general that the belief be a reasonable one in order for an effect to stem
from it, whereas under the ICC Statute the threat must be ‘real’ (Yeo
2009: 95-96). However, legal effect has occasionally been given to
such beliefs. Thus, in a South African case where the accused killed a
child with an axe under the belief that it was an evil bat, Judge Richard
Goldstone commented:
Objectively speaking, the reasonable man so often postulated in our
law does not believe in witchcraft. However, a subjective belief in
witchcraft may be a factor which may, depending on the circumstances,
have a material bearing upon the accused’s blameworthiness. As such
it may be a relevant mitigating factor to be taken into account in the
determination of an appropriate sentence (The State v Netshiavha).9

In a general sense, the rationality at the heart of the international
criminal law – and of Western law – necessarily reduces the causes and
consequences of an illegal act to a fact that is empirically verifiable;
a divergent cultural belief is reduced to a factual error or to a lack of
reason (Comaroff & Comaroff 2004: 193). In the CDF Case, Kondewa’s
argument regarding his positive influence against the commission of
war crimes and crimes against humanity was reduced to nothing: the
SCSL ignored it altogether.
We can close this analysis of the discourse of the Trial Chamber
and of the majority of the Appeals Chamber by asking who is the
audience constructed by this discourse. From what we have discussed,
we can see that the SCSL projects first and foremost a dialogue with
the international community, more precisely with the segment of
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that community engaged in prosecuting war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. The narrative is entirely internal to law, it
produces its own truth as required by the imperatives of justice, and
it corresponds to a culture of legality that is self-sufficient and all
encompassing. This narrative is offered as universal and capable of
transcending all cultural differences in beliefs, practices, values, and
norms.10 The majority attempts to stay neutral or agnostic vis-à-vis
mystical beliefs held by Kamajor fighters, essentially by remaining as
silent as it could while still carrying out the required legal analysis. For
this dissenter, however, no such neutrality is possible and the majority’s
silence throws shadows linking this narrative to colonial discourse.

3 Judge Gelaga King’s Dissent
in the Appeals Chamber
The partial dissent of Judge John Gelaga King, native of Sierra Leone,
takes an entirely different colour. From the outset, Judge Gelaga
King gives a determinative importance to the fact that the Civil
Defence Forces were fighting for the return to power of Sierra Leone’s
democratically elected government, against groups which had taken
power through a coup d’état. Conversely, the majority of the Appeals
Chamber concluded that this factor was irrelevant in determining the
international criminal responsibility of those accused of war crimes
and crimes against humanity. This highlights the importance of the
political context for the dissenting judge.

Judge Gelaga King attacks in an exceptionally virulent manner the
application of the doctrine of superior responsibility by the majority of
the Appeals Chamber and the Trial Chamber. He emphatically rejects
the title of ‘High Priest’ given to Kondewa. Citing the Oxford English
Dictionary, the judge denies that the accused is a member of the clergy or
a religious minister of any type: not being a priest, he can hardly be given
the designation of ‘High Priest!’ In the eyes of the dissenter, Kondewa
was more ‘a “juju man” or “medicine man” or in local parlance “meresin
man”; he was a “masked dancer” or in local parlance “deble dancer,”
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a “gorboi” dancer’ (CDF Appeal Judge King’s Dissent: par 68). Even
though the defence had compared Kondewa to a military chaplain, as
military chaplains are not usually blamed for the crimes committed by
the soldiers they bless, Judge Gelaga King rejects this analogy, denying
that Kondewa had any official role whatsoever (CDF Trial Transcripts
2006: 38). From there, with striking passion, he sharply criticizes the
majority for having seen in Kondewa’s powers sufficient authority to
underpin the application of command responsibility:
It boggles the imagination to think that on the basis of purporting
to have occult powers, on the basis of his fanciful mystical prowess,
Kondewa could be said to qualify as a ‘commander’ in a superior/
subordinate relationship. Without remarking on the novelty of its
finding, the Appeals Chamber Majority Opinion, for the first time in
the history of international criminal law has concluded that a civilian
Sierra Leonean juju man or witch doctor, who practised fetish, had
never been a soldier, had never before been engaged in combat, but was
a farmer and a so-called herbalist, who had never before smelt military
service (‘he never went to the war front himself ’) can be held to be a
commander of subordinates in a bush and guerrilla conflict in Sierra
Leone, ‘by virtue’ of his reputed superstitious, mystical, supernatural
and suchlike fictional and fantasy powers! (CDF Appeal Judge King’s
Dissent: par 69).

We see in this passage multiple words that evoke the unreal and
the irrational such as occult, fanciful, mystical (which is used twice),
fetish, superstitious, supernatural, fictional and fantasy. The dissent
highlights as well the incompatibility of these elements with the legal
reasoning that an international court, based on rationality and a symbol
of modernity, is supposed to use. To make his point even more clearly,
and without the kind of restraint that defines the very legal tradition
he claims to defend, Judge Gelaga King highlights:
In my opinion, the roles found to have been performed by Kondewa
as ‘High Priest’, are so ridiculous, preposterous and unreal as to be
laughable and not worthy of serious consideration by right-thinking
persons in civilised society. If the Kamajors believe in the mystical
power of Kondewa as an initiator, his imaginary immunisation powers

204

'Tintin au Congo'
(as if it was scientific), do the Chambers of the Special Court also
believe that Kondewa could make Kamajors ‘bullet-proof ’ and that
Kondewa’s ‘blessings’ would make them impervious to machine-gun
bullets? And on that basis find him to be a commander? Obviously
not (CDF Appeal Judge King’s Dissent: par 70).

The intellectual framework for the dissent could not be more clear:
the rational thinking of civilization. This logic leads to rejection of the
idea that magic could be a real fact that can be recognized by a court. On
the contrary, it stands as a system of thought with which legal discourse
cannot interact. Anthropologists conducting research on the occult in
Africa have highlighted that terminology itself poses problems: the
word ‘sorcellerie’ in French or ‘witchcraft’ in English reflects a very
particular, Western historical construction, which marks those words
as baleful and diabolical (Geschiere 1998: 1253). The words used in
African languages refer to a more diverse and nuanced set of ideas.
Magic can be both good and bad, depending on who uses it under
what circumstances, and there is a vast vocabulary that reflects this
diversity (Rosny 2005: 172-173). But, far from seeking to introduce a
more nuanced reading of magic into the reasoning of the SCSL, one
that is more faithful to reality as perceived by the Kamajors, Judge
Gelaga King links magic to the ridiculous, the absurd, and the untrue,
all of which are the opposite of civilized rationality (CDF Appeal Judge
King’s Dissent: par 73).11 According to this vision, no engagement
is possible between legal discourse and mystical belief; we should
resist any dissolution of the border between magic and modernity as
incompatible with secular law’s rejection of transcendence (Fitzpatrick
1992: 10, Shaw 2002: 92).
Judge Gelaga King’s approach in his dissent identifies the SCSL as a
site where a discourse of African modernity can be elaborated. To better
understand the context and scope of his position, one must understand
the paradoxical role of witchcraft in many African countries today. On
one level, governments and elites often condemn mystical beliefs as
absurd and primitive. Magic is construed as a fabrication to which an
educated person would never subscribe, a relic of a pre-colonial past
which contemporary African states, in the wake of colonial authorities,
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should try to eliminate. This vision is inspired by liberal philosophy
and is anchored in legality, relying on an individualistic humanism
‘formulated in a grammar or rights and legal privileges’ (Taylor 1989:
11-12).12 Legal discourse, which emanates from and affirms the
sovereignty of the state, is at the heart of this vision. At the same time,
we find in these same African societies popular belief that embraces
mysticism daily and without pause. Thus, a governmental commission
of inquiry into the phenomenon of violence linked to witchcraft in
South Africa reported that in 1996 there were 10,000 healers in
Johannesburg and that 85% of black households in the city used their
services from time to time (Ralushai 1996: 47). More dramatically,
the non-negligible number of murders of people suspected of being
witches highlights both the prevalence and gravity of mystical beliefs.
Anthropological literature suggests that the widespread prevalence
of witchcraft reflects an ancestral heritage that colonialism never
succeeded in eliminating, as well as a common disenchantment in
Africa with the discourse of development, whose promises are now
widely seen as empty (Geschiere 2008: 313). For communities in
the grip of poverty, illness and insecurity, witchcraft brings real and
immediate responses, whereas the long-term solutions of modernity
rarely seem concrete (Niehaus 2001: 200).

The paradox of witchcraft in Africa today goes even further. Indeed,
mystical beliefs and practices are not the preserve of undereducated
populations who are denied access to the benefits of modernity.
On the contrary, the same elites who publicly reject witchcraft as
irrational and unreal often use it themselves in private. It is important
to understand that there exists a very strong association in the popular
imagination between power and witchcraft: if a person is powerful,
she must enjoy considerable magical power. In a country like Sierra
Leone, it is expected that a ‘Big Man’ – a government minister, a
business man, a judge – will discretely consult his witchdoctor from
time to time to maintain or increase his status (Shaw 1996: 35-41;
Geschiere 1998: 1273, Geschiere, 1997: 97-130). There exists as well
a certain postcolonial current that seeks to openly recover witchcraft
as a symbol of an Afro-modernity that does not disown its ancestral
206

'Tintin au Congo'

traditions. By rejecting the civilizing, colonial categorization of magic
as anti-modern, one affirms that magic can, to the contrary, permit
the understanding and anchoring of a modernity that belongs to the
African continent (Niehaus 2001: 185). The intersecting discourses
of witchcraft and modernity in Africa are thus contested terrains of
identity. It is with these tensions in mind that we should read Judge
Gelaga King’s dissent in the CDF case.
If we ask of Judge Gelaga King’s dissent the same question that
we raised for the majority decisions (namely, who is its intended
audience), we can recognize the ambiguity of his position. On one
level, the audience imagined by Judge Gelaga King is the same as that
of the majority, but with a separate objective. He addresses not only
the community of international criminal institutions – of which the
SCSL is a part – but more generally he also addresses the international
community as a whole. In his more general address, King’s dissent is
a protest against the depiction of Sierra Leone as a land of savages
who still believe in magic. In the language of the post-colonialists,
the subaltern speaks to resist the image of Africa as drowning in
superstition, an image that for a long time has served to justify colonial
policies and the Western civilizing mission (Shaw 2001: 50). To do
this, the dissenting judge links the mystical beliefs of the Kamajors
to the factual conclusion made by the majority, suggesting that the
reasoning of the majority can only stand if the judges of the SCSL
themselves believe in Kondewa’s magical powers. According to this
evident distortion of the majority’s logic, if one is false, then the other
must be as well. By denying that these beliefs could really exist in a
manner that justifies their legal recognition as fact, Judge Gelaga King
responds to the media’s representation of the conflict in Sierra Leone,
which portrayed the bulletproofing and invisibility rituals as symbols of
an ahistorical primitivism that is irreconcilable with modernity (Shaw
2002: 82). Judge Gelaga King responds to Hergé to reject the image
of Africans as uncultivated and irrational.
On another level, the dissent belongs to a different dialogue, one of
African modernity. The audience for this discourse are African elites,
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marked, as we saw, by ambiguous and contradictory positions regarding
mysticism. Law occupies a central place in the dialogue surrounding
afro-modernity, as it does for modernity in general. The end of
colonialism in countries like Sierra Leone did not mark the return to a
status quo ante, to a pre-colonial reality excluding all changes stemming
from colonialism. On the contrary, after the rupture of colonialism
came the rupture of decolonization, producing a fragmented society
the governance of which required a new force capable of maintaining
cohesion. This force was, more often than not, legal discourse, a sort
of new fetish whose neutral rationality was presented as capable of
overcoming societal divides (Comaroff & Comaroff 2004: 192).13 The
connection with power is furthermore maintained because the law in
question is uniquely that of that state, reflecting a positivist reading of
legal normativity. Conversely, magic is considered subversive, fuelling
threats to state sovereignty and delaying economic development.
Interestingly, ethnographic studies of Cameroon have found that
witchcraft is often portrayed as subversive in the official discourse of
state representatives, often in the mouths of judges presiding over trials
dealing with occult practices; that said, witchcraft is broadly not seen
as subversive by the individuals directly involved in those practices
(Geschiere 2006: 277). On the contrary, interviews with villagers
suggest that, for them, magic remains an essentially local and social
issue (Geschiere 1998: 1266). In Sierra Leone, this subversive reading
of magic was highlighted in the repression of an attempted coup d’État
in 1992: seventeen people were accused of having used black magic,
and on that basis executed (Shaw 1996: 33).
In many African countries, accusing someone of witchcraft and
practicing witchcraft are both punishable offenses.Accusations of
witchcraft can provoke lynching whereas practicing witchcraft can
be punished ‘if it is susceptible of breaching public peace, or harming
individuals or property’.14 Far from being a relic of an obsolete colonial
past, cases involving witchcraft can comprise a significant part of
judicial activity in a given jurisdiction, leading to possible imprisonment
and non-negligible financial sanctions (Rosny 2005).15 By offering law
as a response to witchcraft, and by using legal institutions in order
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to eliminate mysticism and impose rational thinking, law and magic
are forced to interact in a way that transforms them both. How is it
possible to condemn a person for a crime the reality of which we seek
first and foremost to deny? Witchcraft thus remains a crime without
statutory or jurisprudential definition, a normative obscurity cleverly
maintained by legal actors. Furthermore, in witchcraft cases, law invites
magic to invade its own territory. As remarked by a judge from the
Central African Republic, ‘one must be a witch in order to know who
is a witch!’ (Rosny 2005: 175). Refusing to characterise themselves as
witchdoctors – the contradiction would be too extreme – judges have
developed a widespread practice of inviting witchdoctors to testify as
experts. This testimony could include the identity of an accused as a
witch, the occult nature of certain practices, or the evil effects of certain
objects. Far from denying the reality of magic, legal discourse ends up
instead proclaiming its merits. This legal legitimation of the powers
of witchdoctors has a modernizing effect on magic; in general, these
‘expert’ testimonies are given by a new generation of witchdoctors
who mix ancient customs with the symbols of western modernity, for
example by using the title ‘doctor’ or by suggesting European medical
training (Fisiy & Geschiere 1990: 146-147; Geschiere 2008: 327).
The image of mysticism that emerges from the interaction of justice
and witchcraft in multiple African countries is one which rejects the
caricature of witchcraft as an absurd and obsolete belief, as represented
by Judge Gelaga King in his dissent in the CDF Case. Furthermore,
magic is not open to being reduced to a simple fact construed entirely
according to the logic of law and emptied of all content, as suggested by
the majority’s analysis in the Appeals Chamber in the same case. The
combination of mysticism and modernity undermines a more complex,
uniquely African modernity.

Conclusion
It is reported that, in an effort to make prisoners responsible, SCSL
Registrar, Robin Vincent wanted them to clean their own cells. He
therefore ordered that brooms be distributed to the prisoners so they
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could clean. This provoked a strong reaction from the guards in charge
of watching the prisoners, all of whom were local employees of the
Court. The guards objected that brooms are well known magical
objects, and that the prisoners would use them to escape from the
prison. The project therefore had to be abandoned.16 This anecdote
illustrates the difficulty modernity faces in constructing reality for its
own ends. Even if law, as in the approach of the majority in the CDF
Case, seeks to instrumentalise the factual context in order to reduce
the culture to a coherent whole that can be inserted into the rational
reasoning of legal discourse, culture escapes all attempts at subjugation
and continues to operate on its own terms. It is here that the magic
of Tintin au Congo truly appears: in Hergé’s own world, the author
has unlimited power to imagine a reality in which rational modernity
triumphs entirely over African mysticism. It is tempting to see in the
majority opinion in the CDF Appeals Judgment a belief in a similar
magical power for law.
What divides the majority and the dissent is not necessarily or not
merely conflicting views about the existence and meaning of magic
in African societies, but a wider construction of what it means to be
modern. In the majority opinion, we see reflected an idea of modernity
that represents the progressive construction of the individual as a purely
rational autonomous self, buffered from the external world by his or her
rational powers (Taylor 2011: 39-40). The mystical is discarded as a way
of experiencing the world. Seen in this light, the post-Enlightenment
disenchanted self can make sense of believing in things like magical
bullet-proofing as a psychological reflex of young men afraid to die in
combat. Likewise, leaders like Kondewa reasonably turn to mystical
practices if it can solidify their authority on fighters in their group. The
great subterfuge performed by law is that it imposes this perspective as
the only legitimate, sensible one. For the dissenter, however, modernity
does not necessarily correspond to this disenchanted self produced by
several centuries of intellectual evolution in the West. In Judge Gelaga
King’s reasons, we can discern a different modernity that reconciles a
rational self with acceptance that there is no firm boundary between
self and the cosmos, between inner and outer, between the rational and
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the spiritual. We can read the dissenter’s anger as a reaction against an
imposition by the majority of a certain idea of modernity as the only one
that can be truly modern, all alternatives falling into the primitive. In
daily life, between the vernaculisation of norms and the globalization
of culture, legal discourse and mystical beliefs are two among many
sites for the elaboration of modernity, with none able to claim primacy
over the other. What is at play in the construction of practices such as
bulletproofing is not the establishment of truth but more accurately
the articulation of relations to truth: who can tell the truth, for whom,
and for what purpose. Mysticism and modernity, each in its own way,
attempts to give us a paradigm that explains why things are the way they
are. The challenge which is posed by the dissent is whether modernity
and in its wake law need be monolithic, or whether we can imagine a
plural idea of modernity and law that can reconcile rational thinking
with other forms of beliefs.
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I wish to thank my research assistant, Caylee Hong, for her enormous help
in the preparation of this essay. I also benefited from the sharp reading
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References to Tintin au Congo throughout the article come from the
original edition of the story, published in 1930 in the newspaper ‘Le Petit
XXe’. This version was reproduced in Archives Hergé vol 1 (Casterman 1973:
185-293), presented with no irony as the ‘version primitive, en noir et en
blanc’. Quotations in English are taken from the translation by Leslie
Lonsdale-Cooper and Michael Turner, Tintin in the Congo (2010). See
also Jean-Louis Donnadieu (2011: 32-37).

The sole exception related to an extrajudicial execution, which the SCSL
deemed not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
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For example, ‘Kondewa gave his blessing and the medicines which would
make the fighters fearless if they did not spoil the law. He also said that
all of his power had been transferred to them to protect them, so that no
cutlass would strike them and that they should not be afraid’ (CDF Trial:
par 765).

‘Although he possessed command over all the Kamajors from every part of
the country, this was, however, limited to the Kamajors’ belief in mystical
powers which Kondewa allegedly possessed. This evidence is inconclusive,
however, to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Kondewa had effective
control over the Kamajors, in a sense that he had the material ability to
prevent or punish them for their criminal acts. The Chamber noted that
Kondewa’s de jure status as High Priest of the CDF gave him the authority
over all the initiators in the country as well as put him in charge of all
the initiations. This authority did not give him the power to decide who
should be deployed to go to the war front. He also never went to the war
front himself. The evidence adduced, therefore, has not established beyond
reasonable doubt that Kondewa had any superior-subordinate relationship
with the Kamajors who operated in Bo District’ (CDF Trial: par 853). The
same passage, word for word, is reproduced at paragraphs 806 and 916.
‘Base Zero’ was the CDF base camp, where the three accused were normally
found (CDF Trial: par. 868).

The Appeals Chamber rejects a Defence argument that the standard
is different according to whether the superior is a civilian or a military
commander: (CDF Appeal par 174, 175).
This is clearly articulated by Judge Winter in her partial dissent, which is
otherwise not relevant to the issues under consideration in this essay: ‘Not
being a domestic court, it cannot also accept any cultural consideration
as excuses for criminal conduct. The principle of individual criminal
responsibility requires that an accused be held responsible for his acts or
omissions, whatever his status. In the case where concrete acts or omissions
of an accused have an impact on the commission of the crime in question,
it is irrelevant, for instance, if this accused believes that he has supernatural
powers or if he uses the cultural superstitions of people involved.’ (CDF
Appeal Justice Winter Dissent: par 4).
In that case, in consideration of these beliefs, the Court reduced the
sentence from ten to four years’ imprisonment.
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10 Despite exceptional efforts to plant the work of the SCSL within Sierra
Leone, including visits to the most recluse visits in order to explain the role
of the court, it appears that the court remains largely viewed as a Western
imposition (Ford, 2012; Nkansah, 2011).

11 Thus, Judge Gelaga King calls the reasoning of the Trial Chamber an
error of fact: (CDF Trial Judge Gelaga King Dissent: par 73).
12 As cited in Comaroff & Comaroff 2004: 192.

13 ‘But why this fetishism of the law? In policultural nation-states, the
language of legality affords an ostensibly neutral medium for people of
difference to make claims on each other and on the state, to transact unlike
values, to enter into contractual relations, and to deal with their conflicts.
In so doing, it produces an impression of consonance amidst contrast: of the
existence of universal standards that, like money, facilitate the negotiation
of incommensurables across otherwise intransitive boundaries’ (Comaroff
& Comaroff 2004: 192).
14 Article 251, Code pénal du Cameroun (“si elle est susceptible de troubler l’ordre
ou la tranquillité publics, ou de porter atteinte aux personnes, aux biens ou à la
fortune d’autrui.”). There are variations of this provision in the criminal law
of many French-speaking African countries. In English-speaking Africa,
there are many statutes inspired by the 1899 Witchcraft Suppression Act
(e.g. in Zimbabwe, http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/article/95/
WITCHCRAFT_SUPPRESSION_ACT_9_19.pdf) (Mbousi, 2004).
15 It is reported that between 1970 and 1980, forty percent of trials in the
criminal court of Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic,
related to witchcraft (See Rosny 2005: 174).

16 Author’s interview with Luc Côté, former Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL,
November 2011.
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